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Even though, according to the present custom, politics,
culture and press of our nation, a single village is in
no way of the slightest account, nevertheless the
essential kernel of the social organization of this land
and the essential arena for any judgement concerning its

civilization is, in any case, precisely these scattered
villages...
Al-e Ahmad, Owrazani

1.

INTRODUCTION
In

the

village

of

Bireka

in

central

Kordofan

in

western

Sudan,

as

elsewhere, the political actions of persons at the 'capillaries' of power, and
their 'ordinary' village-level competitions over resources, are enmeshed in
discursive struggles over the meanings of representations of gender, ethnicity,
class and community.
understand

how

representations.

People understand the power of these notions, and they

actions,

practices

and

words

constitute

and

transform

They do not hesitate to use representations to legitimate,

justify and naturalize particular interests.
Analyzing political relations, then, involves viewing politics as a process
where contestations over representations are central events.

In a prescient

discussion, Cohen (1969:224) succinctly summed up this approach:
Some action theorists take the rules of the game, i.e. the symbols
governing social behavior, as given and as being outside the 'arena'
in which the struggle for power takes place, when in fact these
symbols are dramatically involved in the whole process at every one
of its stages.
Local and national discourses of gender, ethnicity and class are mobilized to
reshape the framework and rules that regulate political actions and determine
access to resources (Berry 1993; Watts 1988; and Moore 1994).

Gendered roles

in public and conjugal spaces are often key battlefields where access is
disputed. For example, Carney and Watts (1990) show how the Gambian state gave
men control over irrigated rice plots that were formerly controlled by women.
New irrigation technology entailed an intensification of work.
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The struggles

brought about by these changes were played out on one 'terrain' of gender- what
it meant to be a husband/wife in a Mandinka household, and what comprised their
respective rights and obligations.

Men and women use the full range of dominant

and subversive gender ideologies in the process of struggles, not just within
households, or between men and women, but also in confounding and influencing
struggles involving other social identities and relationships (Di Leonardo 1991;
Moore 1992).
Most analyses of political processes in Sudan, however, tend to ignore the
centrality of these gender, ethnic and class representations.ii

The problem of

maintaining national unity in northern Sudan, for instance, is seen as a problem
of political sectarianism, elite action, and foreign intervention.

Warburg's

(1985:237; see also, Warburg 1993) assertion is typical of this approach to
Sudanese politics:
With Ansari followers concentrated in the western regions of Kordofan
and Dar Fur, in close proximity to an unpredictable ruler like
Qadhafi, the very precarious unity of this vast Sudanese state could
be threatened.
The analysis- basically of passive peasant 'followers' waiting for the call from
'unpredictable' rulers- is belied by the absence of a textured analysis of local
politics of the 'followers'.
This is important because analysts are overlooking what we believe might
be a central paradox of popular conceptions of contemporary Sudan.

The military

regime and the National Islamic Front (NIF), who took power in 1989 under the
rubric of the 'National Salvation Revolution', are attempting to manipulate local
processes in order to acquire legitimacy.

The domination of discourses and

defining of identities is an integral element of what El-Affendi (1991) and
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others have called 'Turabi's Revolution', after the NIF leader Hassan al-Turabi.
The appearance of the first automatic rifle in a village neighboring Bireka in
the spring of 1992 symbolized what the regime hoped to achieve in its program to
transform rural 'tradition'.

The rifle belonged to a young man, Jaabir, who had

led a militia for three months in the nearby Nuba Mountains, fighting with
government forces against the local insurrection.

He had travelled to Chad and

Darfur as part of a delegation recruiting for a nationalist Islamic youth
organization known as 'The Nation's Youth' or Shabab al-Watun.
explicitly anti-local.
national politics.

His rhetoric was

He interpreted events and ideas through the lens of

He thought of himself as a citizen of a modern, Islamic

nation.
The paradox is that the regime's attempts to 'create' more Jaabirs may be
leading

many

Sudanese

to

embrace

discourses,

symbols

and

practices

that

contradict the NIF program, and which undermine their goal of creating legitimacy
'from below'.

We illustrate this point with a discussion of a second conflict

in Bireka, over the regulation of a roadside market.

There, women in Bireka who

joined the Shabab al-Watun used their membership as a rhetorical weapon in their
fight against policies implemented by local agents of the government.

Beating

local history to the rhythm of Khartoum, by recruiting and training people like
Jaabir, could well exacerbate an already well-established trend towards civil
breakdown.
This paper marks a first step toward understanding the micro-politics of
this civil breakdown.

We focus particular attention on examining two central

conflicts in the village of Bireka during the three years between 1989 and 1992.
In one conflict over the administration of a women's grain bank, some wealthy
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Arab villagers raised the issue of the proper public behavior of women.

Poorer

villagers and villagers from 'marginalized' ethnic groups opposed what they saw
as an attempt by wealthy families to preserve and extend their power by wresting
away control of valuable grain.

They entangled the conflict in more general

issues of ethnic marginalization and class solidarity.

In a second conflict

over the participation of women in market activity along a roadside, villagers
again mobilized representations of class, gender and ethnicity.

Some villagers

argued that the roadside was an inappropriate work environment for women tea
sellers.

The closure of the stands was seen by others as marking the definitive

ascendance of 'Arab' villagers over their Hausa and Burgo neighbors.

Other

villagers appreciated the role played by competition for economic advantage;
even some wealthy villagers declared that the motive driving the obstructionists
was that they hoped to eliminate competitors and muscle their way into the
lucrative market activity.
These conflict situations revealed the critical role played by the military
regime and the NIF as their policies and rhetoric were applied and manipulated
to fit local contexts.

The delegation of authority to agents and descendants

of the former Native Administration determined
conflict.

the

outcome of

the

second

Women stopped selling tea after the local omda ordered them whipped.

His decisiveness in the action was facilitated in part by the regime's ambiguous
message about the role of women in public life.

Leaders of the regime encouraged

more female participation, but actions were taken- such as enforcing prohibitions
against beer-brewing in rural areas- that undermined women's livelihoods.
regime has had a similarly ambivalent attitude towards ethnic issues.

The

It offered

an inclusive ideology based on Islam, 'transcending' ethnicity, but excluded
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social groups that did not advocate the orthodox version of Islam promoted by
the NIF.

The regime demanded that villagers place their identity as 'Sudanese'

above local considerations, but defined 'Sudanese' in ways that are at odds with
many of the diacritical marks of local identity.

In short, the regime had not

altered the basic exclusionary nature of centralized political rule in Sudan.
Villagers in Bireka incorporated and manipulated this exclusionary rhetoric and
policy.
The paper is organized as follows.

Section Two summarizes the national

context of economic decline and a military regime intent on transforming certain
aspects of social life and politics.

Section Three describes the norms and

representations that form the political framework of the village, paralleling
them with national policy and rhetoric.

The village study is based on fieldwork

conducted during late 1989 through late 1990, and with a follow-up visit in late
1992.

Section Four analyzes two conflicts in Bireka that illustrate how national

representations intermix with the multiple layers of meaning that underlie local
politics.

Finally, we conclude by returning to the paradoxical outcome of

increasing civil breakdown and change raised in this introduction.

2. STATE REPRESENTATIONS AND POLICIES
Nearly all commentators agree that in the ten years since the publication
of Ali Abdel Gadir Ali's The Sudanese Economy in Disarray the Sudanese economy
has gone from disarray to almost total collapse.

Gross National Product per

capita stagnated after the mid-1970s oil crisis, and declined steadily through
the 1980s.

The industrial sector has exhibited almost no new investment.

on major agricultural schemes have fallen to extraordinarily low levels.
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Yields
This

collapse has been particularly evident in Kordofan province.

Riely (1991) has

documented the growing poverty (and feminization of poverty) among settled nomads
in North Kordofan.

Ahmed (1987) traces the increasing marginalization of herders

and farmers in dar Hamr in western Kordofan.

Manger (1981) and Abdalla (1985)

have presented evidence on ecological deterioration.
The proximate causes of this collapse are civil war, drought, refugees,
adverse international sanctions, and national mismanagement.
declining since the 1960s for most of northern Sudan.

Rainfall has been

The ongoing civil war has

prevented successive governments from managing the economy in the interests of
'development'.

The government's investment budget is sorely taxed by the war;

in 1989/90 almost one quarter of all government spending went to the military
(Mohamed 1993).
since then.

Numerous sources indicate an escalation in military spending

The war has displaced millions of southern Sudanese.

Many have set

up squatter camps outside of major northern cities, further taxing limited state
resources.

Sudan also hosted several hundred thousand refugees from neighboring

conflicts.
The influx of foreign aid that financed state-led investment in the 1970s,
and provided relief during the droughts and refugee crises of the 1980s, has
been cut off since the coup of 1989.

The IMF and World Bank have treated Sudan

as an international pariah, taking the country further along the path to
expulsion than any other recalcitrant debtor.
and financial sources are paltry.

Capital flows from private banking

Only the large flow of remittances from

workers in the Gulf States, Iraq, and Libya has kept the economy afloat.

Even

so, the remittances have proved a mixed blessing.

Brown (1992) argues that

confusion

both

over

the

management

of

remittances
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by

the

government

and

international agencies, and the resulting distortions in prices and policies,
contributed heavily to the mismanagement of the macroeconomy.
From a political economy perspective, the collapse of the Sudanese economy
may be seen as the inevitable outcome of processes of disarticulation and
dependency, of peripheral incorporation into the global market economy (Sultan
1993; Suliman 1992; Mohamed 1989; Ahmed 1987; El Mekki 1986; Tully 1988; and
Prendergast 1991).
the

colonial

Privileged classes, including the military, have transformed

legacy

of

a

'accumulation from above'.

relatively

strong

state

into

an

instrument

for

The organization African Rights (1994) goes so far

as to argue that the civil war is perpetuated by the rent-seekers who benefit
from the distortions justified in the name or wartime exigencies.

The use of

the state to transform property relations, especially in the mechanized farming
areas, manipulate markets for agricultural goods, and regulate labor relations
on the large-scale irrigated schemes, usually to the detriment of migrants from
the west, have precipitated a process of differentiation and deterioration in
the more peripheral rural areas.
In this context of increasing vulnerability and marginalization, the
Revolutionary Command Council of the military regime that assumed power in the
June 1989 coup, and its ally the National Islamic Front, have vigorously pursued
a program of transforming both rural and national politics.iii

Because of the

lack of any significant power base in the country, the process has been topdown, rather than grass-roots.

We focus here on three of the more salient

transformations emanating from Khartoum and affecting rural areas: the return to
Native Administration; changes in the rhetoric about the proper behavior of
women; and a subtle transformation in representations of being 'Sudanese'.
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i. The Return to Native Administration
One of the most significant changes made by the Khartoum government has
been to return authority to adjudicate local disputes and collect taxes to
'traditional' leaders.

These leaders, the sheikh at the village level, omda at

the district level, and nazir or makk at the 'tribal' level, were given a great
deal of power during the Condominium period of 'joint' British-Egyptian rule.
The British moved towards Native Administration or Indirect Rule in order to
save money on administration and minimize the influence of a nascent effendi
class of bureaucrats (Voll 1971).iv

The power of traditional leaders continued

throughout the colonial period, as they came to dominate the rural councils that
were eventually supposed to replace Native Administration.

After independence

the military regime of General Abboud sought the support of traditional leaders
and deliberately appointed them to the councils.
The first serious challenge to the sheikhs came in the late 1960's (Howell
1973; Nyquist 1966).
against

General

associated

with

The civilian government that followed the October uprising

Abboud
a

attempted

traditional

to

eliminate

completely

title,

partially

because

any

leftist

politicians felt that traditional leadership was too conservative.

legitimacy
and

urban

These initial

attempts at reform were unsuccessful, but Jaafar Nimeiri moved decisively after
assuming power in the 1969 coup.

The People's Local Government Act of 1971

formally ended any nationally-sanctioned authority for traditional leaders and
explicitly prevented them from joining the new People's Councils.

Centrally

appointed judges and administrators (dabit) were to take over the judicial,
development, and taxation responsibilities.

Even this definitive attempt to

exclude and transform was not entirely successful.
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Harir (1983) describes how

in one local council in eastern Sudan traditional leaders continued to exercise
considerable authority, often remaining as members of the People's Councils and
courts that had formally replaced them.
The enduring power of traditional leaders, as a class, is due the wealth
they have been able to accumulate through the privileges of office.

They

benefitted from access to education, and their children have often moved into
positions in local bureaucracies, consolidating their influence over local
affairs.

Many leaders transformed this wealth and influence into patronage

networks that maintained a solid core of loyal followers.

They have drawn upon

a reservoir of religious, ethnic and kinship solidarities to legitimize their
leadership role.
The military government and NIF restored the authority of the traditional
leaders during the early 1990's presumably for the same reasons that had
motivated the British.

They disempowered the educated, 'secular' administrators

and justices, saved money on administration, and created a class of political
actors with a strong stake in the regime.

Some of the legitimacy of tribal

leaders 'rubbed off' on the national regime, which had very little legitimacy
given the inability to resolve the economic and military problems that were the
ostensible factors motivating the takeover.
From the regime's point of view, investing traditional leaders with power
could be seen as reestablishing Islamic governance.

Many traditional leaders

are intimately linked to the Sufi tariga that have been an important part of
political life at the national level.

The local populace feels that descendants

of the holy men who founded some villages inherit their baraka, their grace.
This grace may be transformed into a direct political asset.
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El Hassan (1980)

describes this complex and contingent process in Um Dubban, a village in northern
Sudan, where the descendants of a Sufi holy man continued running his school for
Koranic studies.

These descendants gradually began to define themselves as a

separate ethnic group, and were successful in monopolizing the positions of omda
and sheikh.

This phenomenon of simultaneous religious and political leadership

is probably more prevalent in eastern than in western Sudan; this remains an
interesting and open question for comparative research within Sudan.

ii. The Status of Women
Being a Muslim is a defining feature of women's lives: women pray five
times a day, observe Ramadan, give aid to those in need, and some even have made
the hajj to Mecca.

The national regime has used the language of Islam to manage

an ongoing and sometimes contradictory evolution of public norms and practices
surrounding the role of men and women in public life.
been used in negotiating these gendered roles.

Islam has of course always

Local gender divisions of labor,

conjugal contracts, and formal segregation in public spaces are believed to be
based on Islamic ideas.

Economic necessity, however, has forced poorer rural

(and urban) women to work and interact in public spheres (El Bakri and Kameir
1990).

Riely (1991) illustrates how permanent drought and migration of men has

resulted in a feminization of poverty in the northern part of Kordofan province.
Most women have income-generating enterprises; they either work on their own
agricultural plots, market foodstuffs, or brew beer.
An analogous economic process- the migration of men to the Gulf Stares and
Saudi Arabia- has led to a reconceptualizing of the role of women in many parts
of Sudan.

Boddy (1989), for example, concludes her discussion of the full and
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changing complexity of local representations and practices of womanhood in the
context of a riverain village in Northern Sudan (1989:344), by observing that:
It is undeniable that women's behavior is more rigorously controlled
than men's.
Moreover, women are under considerable pressure to
conform to the rather specific ideals of their sex... they are jural
minors all their lives and subject to notable constraints throughout
their reproductive years. And this situation, if the fundamentalist
repercussions of men's Arabian labor experience and the recent (1983)
declaration of shari'a law are any indication, is currently
intensifying.
These evolving and sometimes unacknowledged changes in norms and practices
set the context for regime policy.

The NIF has rejected the 'traditional'

attitudes towards women. According to El-Affendi (1991:174):
... the stance which is more in line with Islamic principles would
be to accept full participation of women in public life, subject to
reasonable safeguards and provisions allowed for in Shariah.
Whatever the potential damage that may arise from free mixing of the
sexes, this should not be used as an argument to deprive women of
the actual and undisputable benefits of participation in public
life...
In

terms

of

specific

policies,

the

NIF

claims

participation of women in political and public life.

to

have

encouraged

the

Hassan al-Turabi, in Lowrie

(1993:46-7), argued that the appointment of around thirty women to the national
parliament, and equal (though segregated at some levels) access to education,
was evidence that "the issue of women in the Sudan is no longer a topical issue."
Many women, primarily from the middle and upper urban educated class, would
agree

with

this

participation

and

position.
have

'Islamisation' process.

They

actively

have
taken

had
part

increased
in

and

access

to

benefitted

political
from

the

They have not resented, and indeed many welcome, the

requirements that women wear less-revealing garb when in the streets.

They

raised no cry against the Ministry of the Interior when it established a 'People's
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Police' to 'ensure the strict application of shari'a in the streets and in daily
life', despite knowing that a primary activity of such a People's Police would
be the harassment of women whose clothing was not up to standard.v
This position is a tacit denial of the discriminatory economic effects of
the dress policy, against poorer women who must invest in new clothing, and
against female office workers who choose not to abide by the regulations.
government decrees have discriminatory and negative consequences.

Other

Beer brewing,

a traditional source of income for many rural women, is being prohibited with
renewed vigor.

Women working outside of the house after sunset are regarded as

suspect, and punished for their 'loose ways'.
The result is an ambiguous government ideology encouraging the comparative
luxury of political participation but discouraging the necessity of working
outside the home, by promoting an image of the Sudanese woman devoted to home
and family life.

This, at a time when economic crisis has effectively forced

many women to search for alternative 'public' employment.

While the national

government has largely not tried to forcibly implement its decrees, local powers
in various parts of Sudan have tried to enforce these decrees by shutting down
market activities and intervening in beer brewing.

iii. Being 'Sudanese'
If the new Sudanese woman stays at home, the new Sudanese man wears a
'fundamentalist' beard.

The cynic says that the 'beard brings the bread', but

even in jest the new representation is thus acknowledged.

The present regime

is refining the nationalist notion that unified and rallied the forces that
fought the British, and provided common ground for regime transitions after
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independence.

'Being Sudanese' is being made equivalent to 'being a particular

kind of Muslim'.
Nationalist representations have been a prominent feature of nationallevel Sudanese politics since the Mahdiyya.

This discourse takes on a particular

importance because of the prolonged North-South conflict and the problem of
competing Afro-Arab identities.vi

A voluminous literature contends that Sudanese

nationalism is an answer to the North-South problem.

Inclusive nationalism- a

lip balm to heal angry sentiments of supposed cultural oppression- was the
rhetorical norm for most of the post-independence period.vii

The rhetoric could

be used to practical effect; Bechtold (1976:158, 195) observes that the revised
1957 Sudanese Nationality Ordinance allowed the Umma party to grant citizenship
to and register loyal Hausa and other West Africans.
The NIF has been explicit about equating 'being Sudanese' with a particular
Islamic orthodoxy.

Hale (1992) quotes Wisal al-Mahdi, the wife of Hassan al-

Turabi and an NIF activist:
We want Islam to judge our cases; we want Islam to judge our economical
activities... We want Islam to be practiced in everyday life, not
just inside the house...we don't want it to be only in a corner of
the life of the family. We want it to be the core of life...[for]
the whole society and the whole Sudan and the whole Muslim world.
That is the only difference between the NIF and the [rest of]
Sudanese society as it has existed since independence.
Hassan al-Turabi has voiced similar sentiments about the Sudanese nation:
So there is an attempt, now, to contain the whole Sudan, the Salafis,
the Sufis, the Ansar, the Khatmiya, even the smaller sects, religious
sects, and the small groups in society, and the professions, and the
artisans; everybody is there. (Lowrie, 1993:45)
The nobility of the sentiment expressed is betrayed by the glaring omission
of a third of the population.

Non-Muslim southern Sudanese are immediately put
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out of the picture- not only the objects of a jihad, they might not be even
second-class citizens in the northern half of the 'Islamic Republic'.

The

exclusionary emphasis, paradoxically phrased as inclusion, directly affects
Muslim residents of northern Sudan.

The government sees the various religious

brotherhoods, the tariga, as closer or further to their definition of the proper
'Sudanese' norm.

Late in 1993 a number of Khatmiya, Ansar and Ansar Sunna

mosques were closed.viii

It may well be that the government is simply continuing

a local process of redefinition.

Doornbos (1988:99) noted the existence of a

'growing polarisation within communities... as to the proper way to live as a
Muslim.'

This polarisation has now been harnessed by the government and attached

to nationalist notions.

As Simone (1994:84) puts it: 'By emphasizing its role

as both the purveyor of radical difference and the restorer of an essential
identity, the Islamic movement can legitimate its claims to state power without
ever having to substantiate an economic program...'
This rhetoric also influences local representations of ethnicity.

It is

ironic that much of the original work on the fluidity and mutability of ethnic
identity was once carried out in western Sudan (Barth 1969).

Where in the 1970's

this nuanced

to facilitate

and textured approach to ethnicity

seemed

the

tolerance of diversity, the regime has twisted the language of tolerance into a
rhetoric of inclusion, going so far as to deny the very legitimacy of ethnic
sentiment.

Hassan al-Turabi declared (in Lowrie 1993:35-36, 63) that in Sudan

there is no such thing as ethnicity, that ethnicity is incompatible with Islam
('Muslims don't know ethnic minorities.'), and that ethnic minorities will
'disappear'.

This ambivalence is profoundly disturbing to members of ethnic

groups, like the Nuba, Beja, Nubians, Hausa and Burgo, who have long argued that

15

members of northern riverain culture have monopolized power and discriminated
against them.

A further source of concern is the regime's reliance on informal

militias, organized along tribal or ethnic lines, to fight as proxies in the
civil war (De Waal 1993).

The arming of tribal militias escalates the stakes

in inter-ethnic conflict, which makes them all the more difficult to resolve
peacefully.

3.

POLITICAL POWER AND REPRESENTATIONS IN BIREKA VILLAGE
The new national-level representations described above were inserted into

the evolution of intra-village social relations in Bireka, a small village of
approximately sixty households in Kordofan province.ix

Authority was devolved

to the omda, away from the civil judge and regional administrator (dabit).
Villagers participated in regional conferences on Islamic administration.

The

granting and withholding of visas, travel permits, identity cards- all important
benefits of citizenship- were interpreted in terms of identity.

Villagers

accused each other of not following 'proper' Islamic codes of behavior.

They

held conflicting interpretations of the ambiguous new rhetoric on the role of
women in society.

This section provides a broad overview of village politics

and representations in this context of changing national policy and rhetoric.
The following section then concentrates on showing how changes were manifested
and manipulated in two village conflicts.
For Bireka devolution of official authority to the omda had been the object
of considerable discussion.

Formal political authority in the village had until

then been invested in the village sheikh and the village representatives to the
district

People's

Committee.

The

sheikh
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was

nominally

responsible

for

maintaining village order, resolving disputes and collecting the animal tax.
The district omda, the traditional leader of about fifty village sheikhs in the
Sheikan area of dar Bederiya (the home area of the Bederiya tribe under the
British system of Native Administration) also lived in Bireka.

He and his two

brothers were very active in village politics and the resolution of disputes, as
the sheikh was rather ineffectual.

Both the sheikh and omda were nominally

hereditary positions, though in practice over the past century genealogical links
were rather tenuous.
The village members of the People's Committee represented the village to
the regional government in El Obeid, and were responsible for the collection and
distribution of rationed commodities like sugar, tea, soap and grain.

Committee

members were supposed to be elected, but in Bireka as elsewhere were more often
selected through consensus, with holders of political power agreeing amongst
themselves who the representatives should be.
These holders of formal political power were members of ethnic groups that
shared a loose identity as Arabs, in contra-distinction with groups whose origins
lay further west- primarily Hausa and Burgo.x

The Arabs were divided into

different groups- Tumam, Beni Fadl (a sub-section of the Bederiya), Mima and
Jellaba.

Arab ethnicity was sensitive in Bireka because of the association of

the Tumam with Nuba origins.

Thus for some Tumam and Bederiya were 'like

brothers- same tribe', while others went out of their way to explain the
differences.

There were strong relations of marriage among the Tumam and Beni

Fadl.
The omda was from the Tumam.

Many villagers feared that he would exercise

his newly acquired authority in new ways.
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The omda was a strong personality;

informants predicted that he would not hesitate to use his power.
policemen with guns.

He would have

He would be able to whip those who committed misdemeanors.

He could send to El Obeid those suspected of greater crimes.

His word alone

would adjudicate land disputes, animal trespasses, divorces, drunkenness, theft,
and all the other small crimes of the district.xi
Part of the reason why the devolution of authority to the omda was important
in Bireka was that four wealthy households from the Tumam and Beni Fadl groups
already commanded substantial economic power.
through marriage ties.

The four families were also joined

In one family, a young man had migrated to Saudi Arabia

and worked for many years as a teacher.

Upon his return the family bought a

lorry and started a large irrigated vegetable garden with a diesel pump.
wealthy family was that of the omda.

Another

His sons and his brothers' sons worked as

teachers, government officials, and operated a small local bakery and irrigated
garden.

Their daughters were married to prominent and wealthy villagers from

surrounding villages.

The head of a third family was the People's Committee

representative for the village.
While

economic

and

political

power

was

concentrated

in

Arab

hands,

numerical strength lay with the two-thirds of Bireka residents who called
themselves Hausa.xii

Though they were the majority, Hausa status as immigrants

had prevented them from holding overt political power.
born in Sudan, were not citizens.
since Independence.

Many Hausa, even those

Nationality laws have been fairly strict

Citizenship has been crucial for securing possession of

land, being able to emigrate to Libya and the Gulf States, and obtaining
government positions.
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The older Hausa men and women settled in Bireka on their return from
pilgrimages to Mecca in the 1930's and 40's.

While most men and younger women

were fluent in Arabic, they continued to speak Hausa at home, and retained a
strong sense of their Nigerian identity.
Burgo.xiii
Islam.

They did not intermarry with Arabs or

The Hausa practiced a more ascetic, mystic and ritualized form of
Married women were more strictly secluded than women of other groups,

but unmarried girls had few restrictions on their movements.

One primary

signifier of difference between Hausa and the other groups in Bireka was that
Hausa women did not work in agriculture.xiv

Unmarried girls worked in the fields

with their fathers and brothers, but more frequently they took to market
processed food products that their older female relatives had prepared.xv
difference

between

circumcised.
process

of

Hausa

and

other

groups

was

that

Hausa

women

Another
were

not

Although many urban Hausa girls were being circumcised in the
'becoming

Sudanese',

these

rural

dwellers

held

fast

to

this

representation of their Hausa identity.
This local culture is perhaps best seen as part of the process of
constructing a local Hausa identity.

The Hausa in Bireka were actually of quite

different origins: some would distinguish their Sokoto or Kano background; others
were Fulani; others bore the distinct facial scars of the Borno from Damagara.
O'Brien (1986) suggests that local animosity has caused many West African
immigrants in Sudan to emphasize differences between them and local people, and
play down intra-group differences.

Migrants have deliberately created separate

ethnic identities; 'In defensive adaptation to circumstances of discrimination
and lumping together by others... these diverse cultural groups have drawn on
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commonalities of their past heritage and contemporary circumstances to forge a
more or less coherent ethnic identity' (O'Brien, 1986:902).xvi
While the Hausa in Bireka constituted themselves as a distinct ethnic
group, there were sharp internal divisions within the group based on wealth.
They were divided into two quarters, one consisting predominantly of poorer
households, the other of

the

wealthier families.

The wealthier

families

represented the Hausa community in village meetings, and acted as leaders in
internal disputes and debates.

They had followed patterns of accumulation

similar to the wealthy Arab families: sons had migrated to Libya, one family had
purchased a lorry, another had established a store on the roadside (described in
more detail below), and two had established small irrigated gardens.
The first large community to settle in Bireka were Burgo from the Chad
border areas.

Most had since moved to an entirely Burgo village further to the

south, and in 1989 there were only a few Burgo left in Bireka.

Nevertheless,

they played an important role in village politics because they often sided with
the Arabs; together the two minority groups almost matched (in the numerical
sense) the Hausa.

The Burgo were much more closely integrated with the Arabs

than with the Hausa.

In the span of one generation, Arabic had become their

primary language; many of the younger children did not speak or understand the
Burgo language.

Because the Burgo in Bireka had adopted Arab cultural values,

many people called them 'Burgowia Arab'.
the

Hausa

who

were

normally

called,

This contrasted quite strongly with
and

occasionally

called

themselves,

'Fallata'.xvii
One of the distinguishing characteristics of Burgo households was the
relative independence of Burgo women, who were involved in two profitable sources
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of income-generation: brewing sorghum beer, which was sold and drunk in their
homes, and operating road-side tea and food stands.
dominated this roadside commerce.
to work in these public tea shops.

Young unmarried Burgo women

Only Burgo permitted young unmarried women
The income derived from the tea shops far

exceeded the daily return from other activities, both male and female.xviii

For

this reason, in several families these young women were the primary breadwinners.

This economic strength allowed many Burgo women to expand their

comparatively large level of personal autonomy.

For example, most married and

unmarried Burgo women did not directly pool their income with the male household
head.

These young unmarried tea sellers followed this trend, not sharing their

income with their fathers, but controlling it and even investing it in productive
enterprises.
it.

One young women rented a plot of land and hired laborers to farm

This independence in the economic sphere did not necessarily translate into

liberty in other personal spheres.

A young Burgo woman was told one evening

that the next day she was to be married to a man from El Obeid.
The common norms associated with Islam were of course important in defining
the role and actions of women.
the village.

Changing national representations were felt in

Two younger women who had attended secondary school in El Obeid

wore the hijab in the village; several uneducated young women who worked selling
tea along the road also adopted this 'Islamic' dress.

More importantly, the

brewing of local sorghum beer became the object of heightened police interest.
This beer, merissa, was the primary source of income for six Burgo and Arab women
in the village.
beer.xix

After a raid by the police, four of them stopped brewing the

Their economic situation deteriorated markedly.

This persecution of

the beer brewers and drinkers was not new; after Nimeiri imposed the shari'a
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laws in 1983 one of the Burgo women had been whipped.

She had returned to

brewing, but in 1990 she stopped again 'for the duration'.
The regime's vigorous promotion of particular Islamic orthodoxies was felt
in other realms of village life.
religious ritual.

The government tried to dominate local

Late in 1990 the government ordered villages to organize

Islamic rain prayers (salat al istisqa').

While serving an exemplary and

absolutely necessary purpose, given the widespread drought and crop failure, the
prayers also conveniently served to generate implicit public displays of the
legitimacy of the regime.

Some neighboring villages had already initiated rain

prayers and fasting and karama, communal meals with prayer, on their own.xx

In

Bireka all the villagers- Hausa, Burgo and Arab- were to pray together (normally
in the village they each prayed in their own mosques, only praying together on
Fridays at the large mosque in the market village).

In a highly political act,

one Burgo man, a respected/feared faqih, refused to participate in the prayers.
His argument at the time was that the government could not determine the method
and rituals of prayer- doing so violated the whole spirit of prayer.
The changing role of Islam in public life especially affected the Hausa,
who

were,

as

we

will

see

more

incorporation and separateness.

clearly

below,

caught

in

a

dialectic

of

As many of them were not officially recognized

citizens, the benefits from incorporation were great.

At the same time,

maintenance of Hausa identity was important in the struggles over control of
village

politics.

New

conflations

of

Islam

and

'being

Sudanese'

were

a

significant source of anxiety in casual conversation, and several Hausa men had
taken the initiative of regularly attending evening 'classes' given by the imam
in the neighboring market village.

A visiting religious guide (a murshid)
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visited the village, and the Hausa enthusiastically agreed to participate in the
setting up of a program for religious education of boys.

A Hausa man was

appointed to be faqih and lead the boys in reciting the Koran every evening.
Arab boys participated in the first week, but then their parents decided they
should no longer attend.
Finally, lest the reader think that life in Bireka was nothing more than
stratagems and spoilsxxi, we should note that everyday politics was constrained
by a shared awareness of the crucial nature of language about community.
Throughout most of our stay in Bireka, the standard answer to questions about
village politics was: 'There are no problems here, we live together peacefully.'
But this solidarity was tempered by the sharp gradations of wealth within
the village, and quite articulate notions of class consciousness within the
village.

As noted above, there were several Arab and Hausa families who were

significantly wealthier than others, with large livestock holdings, irrigated
gardens, lorries or trading capital, and relatives who had migrated to Iraq,
Libya and the Gulf States.

They contrasted with the one-third of households

which had male or female members who worked as daily laborers, and whose household
assets typically consisted of their hut, a few goats, and simple household
furnishings.

These differences did not result in any overt class conflict, at

least not in 1989 or early 1990.

Labor relations were cordial, with an active,

competitive, and decentralized market for hiring spot labor.
enmeshed in debt relations with their employers.
intra-village debt at all.

Laborers were not

Indeed, there was almost no

Nevertheless, poor villagers would often note the

structural differences in the village, and how those differences translated into
different

interpretations

of

community
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interests.

Wealthy

villagers

were

selected as members of the People's Committee, in charge of securing and
distributing rationed commodities, and the weekly distributions were the sites
of numerous arguments.

There were frequent muttered complaints of corruption

and favoritism, both in Bireka and in the larger market villages.
Village unity was also undermined by the ethnic differences described
above.

Hausa, Burgo and Arab all prayed in their own small village mosques.

They did not share in the breaking of Ramadan fasting together, each small group
held their own evening meal.
parties.

They did not usually attend each others labor

Derisive remarks and stereotyping of the other groups were not

infrequent.

There was no inter-marrying.

At large public events like weddings,

naming days, and the karama meals that marked the return of migrants or other
events of good fortune, groups would show up together along ethnic lines: first
a large group of Arabs, then a group of Hausa, and they would usually sit apart.xxii

4.

THE DYNAMICS OF VILLAGE POLITICAL STRUGGLES
In Bireka, class, gender, ethnicity and community were interrelated social

constructs that, together with the political institutions such as the village
sheikh and omda and the People's Committee, constituted the structures within
which individual political action was embedded.
loyalties

in

particular

approaches to politics.

confounded

simple

Gender politics and ethnic

class

and

corporate

community

Hausa, Arab, and Burgo identities shaped political

interaction, and these ethnic identities were also significant components of the
intra-household politics that reproduced divisions of gender.

Shared notions

of gender roles in turn also shaped village politics, which was after all not
solely determined by men.
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We shall see this quite clearly in this section, where we describe and
analyze the micro-dynamics of local politics in two situations of conflict where
the role of women in public and economic life figured prominently.

The first

conflict was over control of a woman's grain cooperative, the second over the
permissibility of women working along the roadside.

4.1 'Cooperative Conflict'? Drought and Community Struggles over Access to
Resources
We will tear down the grain store with our bear hands,
and leave the rubble in the street for lorries to run
over it, so that everyone can see how the rich tried to
destroy the cooperative.
Bireka villager, 1990

In 1989 the Regional Ministry of Cooperatives and UNICEF organized a grain
bank project among the women of Bireka in 1989.

The villagers contributed to

the building of a storehouse, and UNICEF provided a large quantity of grain as
start-up capital for the bank.
participated.

Only the Arab and Burgo women in the village

Several Hausa men claimed that Hausa women could not participate

because it was not possible for them to be present at public functions or to
participate in public work.
After the grain arrived, the Burgo and Arab women promptly distributed it,
deposited the proceeds from the sale with the Ministry of Cooperatives, and
waited for the next allocation.
storage project.

This was not quite the theory of the grain

In principle, they should have waited until the rainy season

to distribute the grain, when grain prices were highest and cheap grain would
alleviate the cash constraint on agricultural production.

The women however

displayed an alacrity the project organizers had not counted on.
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Village women

knew that the quicker they disbursed the subsidized grain the quicker they could
petition for a new shipment.
Grain prices rose sharply in 1990 as the prospects for a good rainy season
diminished, and this precipitated a serious struggle within the village over the
cooperative.

Hassan, one of the prominent Arab men in the village, a supporter

of the National Islamic Frontxxiii, and a relative of both the omda and sheikh,
began

to

attend

and

attempt

to

control

the

meetings.

He

expressed

dissatisfaction with Khadija, the Burgo woman who was the president of the
cooperative.

She was highhanded and put on airs, he argued.

She was corrupt

and was personally benefitting from the project.
Initially, the conflict could easily have been characterized as the result
of individual animosities and personality clashes.

Khadija, whose husband had

left her and remarried, relished her role as village spokeswoman and leader for
development projects.

She travelled alone to El Obeid frequently; an anomaly

in a village where many women had never travelled the forty kilometers to the
city.

Khadija had close social ties with the Cooperative extension agent, and

she may have known that he would refuse to let the villagers revoke her position
as

President.

perquisites.

There

may

well

have

been

petty

graft

Khadija's brother was a village trouble-maker.

or

unacknowledged

In the past, when

the family was wealthier and there were more Burgo in the village, he held
considerable power.

In 1990 he was no longer wealthy, but still played the role

of spoiler and political gadfly.
Hassan, on the other hand, was a strong supporter of the ideology of the
NIF.

He thought that women should not be active in public spheres.

He was

unafraid to bring up for discussion issues of public and personal conduct.
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He

could afford the derision this sometimes occasioned from other villagers, because
he was the wealthiest man in Bireka.
Hassan organized the sending of a letter signed by slightly fewer than
half of the women in the cooperative, requesting that the Ministry remove the
president and hold new elections.
candidate.

His wife was put forward as an alternative

The Cooperative officer from El Obeid would not allow them to replace

the president; the rules of the charter would not permit it, he declared.

If

the members could not agree, he would have to shut the cooperative project down.
The officer made it clear that a shipment of grain would be provided only if the
cooperative could resolve its problems.
Instead, in a series of meetings over the summer, the conflict escalated.
On several occasions, Hassan was asked to leave cooperative meetings, both by
the members and by the cooperative officer.

He refused to do so.

He was

supported by other wealthy Arab villagers who did not like a powerful woman from
the Burgo ethnic group controlling the cooperative; they would rather disband
the cooperative and block the villagers access to cheap grain than have Khadija
remain as president.

Privately, some of the other Arab families admitted that

they did not believe Khadija was corrupt, but felt compelled to support Hassan,
the wealthiest and most powerful man in the village.
Hassan's involvement caused other village men to join the fray.
conflicting interests brought the idioms of
struggle.

Their

class and ethnicity into

the

The poorer villagers from Arab families articulated the struggle as

between the wealthy Arab families and the poorer Arab and Burgo families.
rich do not want us to eat,' one farmer put it.
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'The

A Burgo man claimed that the

poor would tear down the mud storehouse and leave it in the road, for all to see
how the rich had 'destroyed' the cooperative.
Idioms of gender roles were used extensively; the Burgo woman was a female
household head, and some men argued that they should have more control and
influence in the 'women's' cooperative.

Many women shouted them down; men had

no role in this women's cooperative.
Tensions reached a fever pitch when Khadija, in a desperate bid to retain
control of the women members, trumped her wealthy Arab opponents by inviting the
Hausa women to become members.

Hausa men had originally been satisfied with

Hausa women's non-participation, claiming that it would undermine the status of
women to be seen engaging in the various manual activities of the cooperative.
But with the rise in the price of grain and the shift in the rhetoric, the Hausa
men were faced with a strong incentive to renegotiate their opposition to female
participation.
central.

Moreover, the issue of ethnic rights in the village became

Some Arab and Burgo men claimed that the village was 'their' village

and hence the project was 'theirs'; Hausa women were, after all, outsiders to
the village, and thus could not join the cooperative.
The

additional

members

would

dilute

Cooperative Ministry claimed was forthcoming.
receive less.

the

available

grain

that

the

The Arab and Burgo families would

Nevertheless, the majority of the poorer villagers who sided with

Khadija apparently determined that the smaller shares were worth the retention
of control over the cooperative.

The maneuver succeeded; Hausa leaders, many

of them wealthy themselves, and a majority of poorer men and women, made it clear
that they would fight further attempt to remove Khadija.
position and the grain was delivered.

Khadija retained her

Shortly after that a more general relief
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distribution began (unforseen at the time), with households receiving substantial
quantities of grain, and rendered the conflict moot.
The triple idioms of ethnicity, class and gender were invoked in a struggle
over access to resources; resources that were fundamental in alleviating the
crisis faced by poorer villagers.

The Burgo president did not allow powerful

men in the village to undermine her control.

She actively sought the backing

of other Burgo women and the administration of the 'women's' project.

In

development discourse, she was an independent, self-starting women, and therefore
a perfect project leader.

The powerful Arab men wanted to control the project,

pitched at empowering village women, once it became apparent that proceeds were
more substantial than the usual weaved baskets and embroidery of most womenbased development efforts.

They used the discourse of proper public behavior

of women to justify their interest.

When Hassan, the wealthy Arab, put forth

his wife as a potential president, he contrasted her, a quiet, modest, pleasant
young mother, with Khadija.
potentially corrupt.

Khadija was a divorced, independent, brash woman,

Her brother was frequently called upon to 'control' her.

She was, in dominant male village discourse, disrespectable and an inappropriate
project leader.
A conflict that was initially phrased in terms of the role of men and women
in public life was basically about competing claims to power in the village, and
was ultimately resolved when the idiom of ethnicity was invoked.

It was perhaps

ironic that Hausa men were confronted with a similar rhetoric of exclusion that
they used on women.

In assessing the relative merits of the claims, they decided

that Hausa identity depended less on the seclusion of women and more on an
assertion of rights to participate in village institutions.
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During this period, the military regime in Khartoum was transmitting and
implementing its own representations and principles of conflict.

As they

filtered down to the village level, they shaped new relations of power and new
discourses.

With

the

next

case

study,

we

illustrate

how

these

changes

transformed village relations and, in part, engendered a new crisis over the
role of women's work.

4.2

'Petty Crimes'? Conflict Over Women's Work at the Roadside
To whip someone for a crime? Yes. This is not new. It
has existed since colonial times.
For petty things,
instead of sending someone to prison, they are whipped.
Ahmed Abdallah Idriss
Sudan Minister of Justice, 1993
...the police came and wanted to beat us, but we said
we were the government and we would be beating them
before too long.
Bireka villager, 1992
Changes in the power and dominance of representations about gender and

ethnicity came into play in 1991 when government officials from El Obeid ordered
closed the roadside stands at Um Belda, a truck and bus stop a few minutes walk
away from Bireka.
restaurants.

Many women from Bireka operated gahawi- small tea stands and

Most of these were younger unmarried Burgo women, but two older

(and poor) Arab women also had stands.

Young Hausa girls sold sesame candies,

roasted groundnuts and cowpea falafel, known as tami'a, that their mothers or
older relatives made in the village.
Men also worked at the roadside.

One Hausa household of three brothers

operated a stand, often hiring young Arab and Burgo men from Bireka.

The sons

of a wealthy merchant from the market village operated a large tea stand.
Hausa men from a neighboring village sold kebab at night.

30

Two

Young men often set

up small stands in front of the gahawi and sold vegetables and cigarettes brought
from El Obeid.

Farmers sold watermelons.

The stands were supplied by a Hausa

man from Bireka who operated a fairly large store (also selling black market
cigarettes and gasoline to lorry drivers and travellers), and an Um Belda man
with a small tin shack, a kushk.

A Hausa butcher slaughtered sheep, goats and

occasionally cows every morning.

An Arab from Bireka supplied the stands with

bread from his small wood-fired bakery.

Young men from all ethnic groups were

hired to build straw shelters, rakuba, and larger mud structures.

In 1990 the

roadside was the most dynamic sector of the local economy.
Conflict was present.
extraordinarily high.

The income earned by the young Burgo girls was

This sometimes led to conflicts within Burgo households.

For example, in one family, the daughter had hired agricultural laborers with
her earnings from her tea-shop.

She expected to control the crop income even

though her parents considered the fields to be family agriculture.

These intra-

household conflicts over shares and control of income were managed and kept under
control because the size of the pie was large and expanding; perceptions were
that participation in the roadside economy was a positive sum game.
These perceptions were shattered in the spring of 1991, when the sheikh
received a letter from the governor's office in El Obeid ordering the gahawi
closed.

The official explanation was that the site would be surveyed and permits

issued for 'proper' buildings.

Operators would have to pay a much larger fee

for operating licenses.
Few believed that this was simply a case of 'public improvement'.

There

were numerous stories about why the governor's office had closed the site.

One

was that during a celebration of the opening of a regional grain storehouse the
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driver of the bus transporting a party of government officials had gotten drunk
at Um Belda.

Another was that jealous merchants who did not have gahawi wanted

the government to raze the existing ones so they could take over the area and
build larger structures.

Some of the local National Islamic Front supporters

alleged that the girls working at the gahawi were prostitutes.

Most people were

convinced that Hausa-Burgo-Arab ethnic rivalries played a decisive role in the
closing; people were sure that numerous letters had been sent to the governor's
office alleging misbehavior by one group or another.

Larger political structures

of regional administration were also supposedly involved; the next village down
the road saw almost none of the trucks stopping, and the regional rural council
president was from that village.
The stands remained closed for almost a year.

During that time a new

organization started recruiting young people in the area.

Called Shabab al-

watan, 'The Nation's Youth', the organization was supposed to agitate on behalf
of the Sudanese nation by mobilizing rural populations and by providing community
services.

Members received identification cards, worked occasionally building

schools, cleaning villages and towns, and held meetings.

In the El Obeid area,

the leaders of the organization were sympathetic to the NIF.
military

training

for

chapters

and

fought

alongside

They organized

militias

in

southern

Kordofan.
For many young people in Bireka, the organization provided a sanctioned
forum for social activities.

One of the first acts of the local chapter was to

build a small 'meeting house' on the outskirts of the village.
who worked at the gahawi were eager participants.

Many Burgo girls

It was through their

involvement with the Shabab al-watan that they decided that the government's
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closure of the tea stands was no longer valid.
'members' of the Sudanese state.

They had I.D. cards.

They were

How could working be a crime?

After the rainy season many of the young women began to work again at the
truck stop. After a few months the police came. According to one young women:
About ten girls were taken away, and spent the whole day in the
'prison' yard next to the police station. They were taken to El
Obeid, and held outside the court. The police did not take them in,
because they knew that they had no reason to close the gahawi in the
first place. They brought the girls back.
The women were emboldened by their victory, for they promptly reopened the

gahawi.
A few months later, the omda finally received his formal authority from
the government.

One of his first actions was to order the stands closed.

They

were causing too much disruption, he argued, and the government had ordered that
they be closed until proper procedures were established.
intervention were high and the costs relatively low.
the profits of Hausa and Burgo women and girls.

The benefits to his

Many Arab women resented

By using his authority to keep

the tea stands closed, he acquired prestige and support from NIF supporters,
merchants from neighboring villages, and his governmental superiors.
For several months the stands remained closed.

Then some of the girls

decided that strictly speaking the government and the omda had closed the stands,
but had not prohibited working, and so they started making tea under the trees
near the road. The police came again. As one young woman put it:
They took the girls to court and said they would fine them LS
300 or one month in prison.
How could people pay that much?
A
delegation of women went to protest at the district offices and made
a lot of noise. The girls said they would not pay, they would go
to prison. But the police brought them out. They were afraid to
take them to the court in El Obeid. They gave twenty-five lashes
to five girls.
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The whipping was the end of women working at the roadside.

By late 1992 all the

stands were closed and overgrown; some of the mud walls had been torn down.
two stores were open, but with very few customers.
drove past the roadside without stopping.

The

Most lorries and buses simply

Everyone was poorer.

This conflict was symbolically framed around the issue of what work was
appropriate for women.

Many villagers attributed the initial closing of the

stands to alleged beer-brewing and an inappropriate work environment for young
women.

The omda, though, was clearly less concerned about the issue of the

morality of young women (the primary concern of the national government) than he
was about preventing dissension and disrespect.

He and his wealthy supporters

may have seen a threat to the economic power that underwrote, in part, their
political power.

Moreover, national policy had forced him to act, by conflating

his legitimacy with enforcement of a particular idea about how 'Sudanese' women
should act.
While this conflict was nominally about a principle of conduct issue,
power and control over access to resources were at the root.

The disruption of

the closing of the tea stands caused many villagers to experience large drops in
income, but some wealthy villagers were unapologetic.

As one villager noted,

"If I'm sick and go to the doctor, I have to pay; now the poor complain about
their problems, but they should have known better than to get sick."
words, the poor should know better than to challenge the rich.

In other

It was not an

accident that the divisions between the whippers and the whipped were the same
gender, ethnic and class lines that had previously demarcated and crosscut
village battlefields.

34

6.
Struggles

over

resources

in

CONCLUSION
rural

Kordofan

are

intensifying.

The

increasingly interconnected national economy holds out, with equal possibility,
the promise of greater resilience and the threat of market-mediated entitlements
crises.
inflation,

The

continuing

and

uncertainty.

mismanagement

internationally-engineered

of

the

macro-economy,

economic

sanctions

concomitant

adds

to

this

This environment of economic and ecological instability has led

not just to conflicts over resources but struggles over the meanings and
representations that are crucial in the allocation of resources.
The cooperative conflict illustrates this point.

Wealthy men attempted

to seize control of the women's grain cooperative because the grain had become
extraordinarily valuable and important to village affairs.

They deployed a

well-understood debate on the role of women in public life.

They asked: What

kind of woman should be president?; A divorced woman from a poor family?

These

objections were transparently selective: no one had questioned the woman who
headed the adult literacy program, or Khadija's organization of a tree nursery
planting for another development project.

The issue at hand was not really

about what type of woman could head a project, but what group in the village
would control power.
The importance of the resources at stake propelled Hausa men and women to
renegotiate their representation of women's participation in public spheres.
Hausa women joined the cooperative, not to assert their rights as women, but
because both Hausa women and men wanted to assert their rights to be 'Sudanese',
to be fully-fledged members of the village community.
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These village-level discussions of what it meant to be 'Sudanese', or what
it meant to be a woman active in public spheres, must also be placed in the
context of larger economic and political changes in Sudan.

Villagers refracted

national rhetoric and policy through local representations of gender, class and
ethnicity; they were neither passive recipients of state policies and rhetoric
nor stubborn resistors to outside influence, closed off from national discourses.
The devolution of authority to the omda illustrated this point.

He used

his power to implement an important platform of the regime- a stricter regulation
of women's public activities.

Just like Jaabir and his rifle and his membership

in the Shabab al-Watun, the actions of the omda in closing the tea stands
symbolized the government ideal of what it meant to 'become Sudanese'.

But the

omda also embodied the multiple contradictions of the regime's manipulation of
local representations and power structures.

One of his first acts was to appoint

as assistant the grandson of an early colonial makk of the Tumam.

A Bireka

villager argued that despite the young 'son of the makk' being less than a wise
and seasoned leader, he conferred legitimacy on the omda: 'The makk has history.
He and his family have been here a long, long time.

This land is their land.'

The appointment represents an interesting inversion of Kapteijns (1985)
argument about Mahdist revolts in far western Sudan.

There villagers on the

periphery apparently rallied around Mahdist leaders who invoked religion to
legitimize their violent uprisings against an ancien régime that legitimized its
rule

by

the

principle

of

inheritance.

In

1992,

monopolized the discourse of Islam in its favor.

the

Khartoum

government

We do not know whether the

government appreciated the irony of having traditional, 'tribal' leaders wield
authority in the new and modern Islamic state, but villagers on the periphery
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certainly did.

The omda was quick to invoke the discourse of inheritance, 'royal

blood' and history to justify his invigorated authority.

He understood all too

well the anomaly of his position of power; the very opposite of the regime's
intended effort to transform rural villagers into 'Sudanese'.

He understood in

particular the immediate practical implications of devolution, which was to
fracture a multi-ethnic village by further excluding Hausa and Burgo from the
levers of formal authority.
Other villagers appreciated and refracted government rhetoric in like
fashion.

The young, unmarried Burgo woman who operated a tea shop and also

belonged to the Shabab al-Watun had interpreted government rhetoric in an antiauthoritarian and explicitly local manner.

For her there was no contradiction

in being a Sudanese woman, a good Muslim, and working in a tea stand at a truck
stop.

In the end she was whipped for her interpretations, not by representatives

of the national government, but by the local 'traditional' powers recently
delegated formal authority by the national government.
The

conflicts

we

have

analyzed

in

this

paper

are

examples

intensification of processes of immizerization and civil breakdown.
1992 there were clear markers of these processes.
in public activities.

products there.

an

In late

Very few women earned income

Only one or two women brewed sorghum beer.

stands along the roadside were closed.

of

The tea

No Hausa girls sold their mothers'

The closure of the roadside may have prompted many Burgo men

to migrate from the village: stories of unimaginable hardship were told of their
crossing the desert to work in Libya.

Only a few Hausa men could travel, because

most were not 'citizens' and did not have passports or identity cards.
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The

increased numbers of women left alone to manage their households confronted a
hostile official world and became increasingly marginalized.
In 1992, the senior Hausa leader was resigned to bitter conflict with the
Arab leadership.

The People's Committee had lost all legitimacy with the

appointment of a poor, broken merissa drinker as the representative of the Arabs.
The Arabs bypassed many respected community members who were Hausa.

After the

death of the sheikh, the Arabs appointed his clearly incapable son as the new
sheikh.

The principle of heredity had to be sustained in order to preserve Arab

dominance, even if it meant rewarding an incompetent man.
undertake the process of an official investiture.

They did not, however,

All recognized this cynical

undermining of the legitimacy of the institution.
We began this paper by discussing a possible paradox in contemporary
discussions of Sudanese politics: that by ascribing heterogeneous outcomes to
the Khartoum agenda we may be obscuring the complex processes of transformations
at the local level.

It is unclear whether these transformations will filter up

to affect regional or national politics.

The presence of Jaabir's rifle, and

of ethnic, gender and class conflict in Bireka, is of course no indication that
what Prendergast (1991:49) calls 'a descent into Lebanon-like anarchy' is
imminent.

Just a few hundred kilometers away, though, in southern Kordofan, the

region had exploded into warfare during the late 1980's, and the actions of the
Sudanese army and militias drew international headlines.

H.B. Ibrahim (1988)

argues that the violence was not simply the result of an expanding Sudan People's
Liberation Army (the main rebel group in southern Sudan opposing the Khartoum
government) but rather had its roots in what he calls a local 'legitimation
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crisis', brought about by the differentiating effects of agricultural development
projects and out-migration to Khartoum.
Much more comparative work would have to be done before we could determine
and

explain,

with

any

confidence,

how

local

processes

contribute

construction of widespread consent to nationalism and central authority.
they undermine state power and lead to civil disintegration.

to

the

Or how

Before a story

like that of Jaabir and the tea women and the Shabab al-Watun could be considered
an adequate metaphor for local political processes, we would need comparable
village-level analyses from other parts of northern Sudan, as well as intimate
analyses of urban local politics at the grass-roots level.
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Footnotes
*This paper was inspired by the senior Hausa man in the village of Bireka use of
the proverb, 'When with dwarves, it is best to stay on your knees', to describe
the village political relations between Hausa and Arabs. The general meaning
was clear: when confronted with people who do not see things your way, you should
be careful to pretend to see things their way, lest they resent your
presumptuousness. The context in which he used the proverb will become apparent
in the text. He and many other villagers in Bireka endeavored to teach us the
basic principles of local politics, and the many inadequacies of this paper are
a reflection of our inabilities to grasp all that was taught. In the United
States, Tom Bassett, Misty Bastian, Jeremy King and Shaun Malarney provided
extensive comments.
We are also grateful to three anonymous referees for
critical comments that led to a substantial rewriting of the paper.

i.Cited in Mottahedeh (1985:294-5).
ii.Several recent analyses of Sudanese society have approached the nationallocal nexus of class, religious, ethnic and gender representations; see Baumann
(1987), Doorbos (1988), Bernal (1994), and Simone 1994.
Only Simone (1994),
however, devotes explicit attention to how Sudanese deploy these representations
in political conflicts.

iii.Warburg (1985:227) describes a similar breadth in the strategies and
programs of Nimeiri to transform Sudanese society.

iv.The re-ascendance of traditional leaders was by no means assured; Daly (1986;
1991) has carefully documented the internal disputes within the British
administration that led to the formal adoption of Native Administration
discussing how the Khartoum administration did not really devote many resources
to strengthening, formalizing and curbing the excesses of the institution of
tradition leadership.

v.Indian Ocean Newsletter (1 August 1993).
vi.National leaders regularly visit Sheikan, the battle-site where the Mahdi
defeated Hicks Pasha, in order to renew their nationalist credentials.

vii.Though as Fluehr-Lobban (1990) points out, this nationalism was rarely
secular, most political parties in the north were quite explicit in advocating
the dominant role of Islamic ideas in the national domain.

viii.Africa Research Bulletin (Vol. 30, No. 6). For an interesting discussion
of the original Mahdi's attempts to curb variegated Islamic practices in Sudan,
and impose a single expression of Islam, see Voll (1979).
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ix.The name of the village, and all personal names, are fictitious.
x.We are by no means trying to 'create' oppositional identities in this paperthe central focus is not how the character or nature of these identities motivates
actors, but rather how they use these identities as vocabulary in political
discourse. See Spaulding and Kapteijns (1991) and A.A. Ibrahim (1988).

xi.Interestingly, one of the first things the omda did, after power was
officially transferred to him and the local court was abolished, was to hire the
former court clerk as his assistant.

xii.According to the 1955 census, Hausa made up almost 18% of the population of
dar Bedeiria, the district that then surrounded El Obeid.

See Born (1965:115).

xiii.One exception- an older Hausa man marrying a very young Burgo girl who was
pregnant, and their subsequent divorce- proved the rule.
In some larger
neighboring villages there were numerous examples of marriages crossing ethnic
boundaries.

xiv.The symbolic representations of Hausa women as secluded and submissive were,
of course, confronted with harsh economic realities. One poor Hausa woman said
that while Hausa women could not work in agricultural production, she cultivated
because she was poor. A few other poorer and older women also farmed individuals
plots, although they did not work on the family agriculture.

xv.Hausa women also hand-pounded their grain into flour rather than taking it
to town to be ground by the mill. This was a point of pride for both the men
and women. Many Hausa indicated that their porridge was superior to that of the
other ethnic groups because it was 'pounded by the strong arms of Hausa women'.

xvi.On the other hand, O'Brien argues that in eastern Kordofan some West Africans
have 'assimilated' Joama Arab identity because of specific influences of national
and regional labor markets. In these labor markets, the Joama are reputed to
be good cotton pickers. West Africans benefit from adopting the Joama identity,
and local Joama have accepted migrants into the group because the migrants are
an additional source of labor for their own fields.

xvii.In other villages there were 'Fallata Arab'.

For a discussion of the
meanings of 'Fallata', see Duffield (1988). The term was used extensively by
Arabs and Burgo, often in the presence of Hausa.

xviii.Some reported, in 1990, making profits of from LS 30 on a bad day up to
LS 100 on a good day, a time when the average daily wage for agricultural labor
was around LS 30. Most participated in a revolving savings fund with the other
tea women. One woman with three shares in the fund took home LS 3600 in savings
every two months.

xix.The raids were recounted with considerable hilarity, because the only person
caught was the brother of one of the policemen. Being a poor man unable or
unwilling to pay the fine, his brother had to loan him the money to avoid being
whipped.

xx.Abdalla (1985) reports that rain prayers were held in dar Hamar villages in

the early 1980's.

xxi.(Bailey 1980)
xxii.There was a direct correlation between age and wealth and the extent to
which these ethnic differences were maintained.
more freely.

Poor and young men interacted

xxiii.Using the word 'fundamentalist' would be simpler but the term is now too
connotative of disapproval and discourse about an 'Islamic threat' to western
'national security'. During our stay in western Sudan we never heard another
word used locally to describe 'fundamentalists'. Many times people would say
"so-and-so is Jabha" referring to the National Islamic Front, or they might say
"so-and-so is an akh Muslim", a member of the Muslim Brothers, or finally they
might not say anything and just stroke their chins, with a knowing look,
indicating that so-and-so's political/religious views were like those of
prominent Islamic Front members who wore beards.
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